This paper analyzes ownership strategy in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CB M&As) undertaken by the multinational enterprises (MNEs) in emerging economies. We use new institutional economics and organizational learning theories to hypothesize and empirically analyze the influence of formal and informal institutional distance, and MNEs' host country experience on the MNEs' choice between full and partial CB M&As. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 184 CB M&As launched by MNEs in emerging economies. Our empirical results revealed that high formal and informal institutional distances lead to a preference for partial CB M&As however, MNEs' host country experience moderated the relationship between institutional distance and the MNEs' choice between full and partial CB M&As. We found that MNEs with prior investment experience in the focal emerging market opted for full CB M&As over partial CB M&As despite high formal and informal institutional differences.
INTRODUCTION
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CB M&As) remain a very popular foreign market entry strategy (Contractor et al. 2014) . Unlike the strategic alternative (greenfield) where a foreign subsidiary is set up from scratch over a longer period of time, CB M&As allow firms to achieve important strategic goals such as speedy entry into a new geographic market or an industry, consolidation of market power in concentrated global industries, firm transformation, taking advantage of a new opportunity or avoiding a possible future threat (Hennart and Park 1993; Collins et al. 2009 ). Furthermore, through CB M&As firms procure assets from indigenous firms such as advanced technologies, reputable or locally recognized brands and valuable human resources (Anand and Delios 2002; Chen and Zeng 2004) . Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the value and the number of CB M&As has been on the rise over the years-the total value of CB M&As in 1990 is registered at $98.90 billion while the value in 2012 is reported to be $308.05 billion (UNCTAD 2013) .
Not all CB M&As are fully owned by the acquirer despite the obvious advantages of full ownership such as unrestricted access to all the assets of the target firm, the possibility to fully control the strategy of the acquired business and to influence organizational change (Jakobsen and Meyer 2008) . MNEs often incur extra costs to manage partially acquired businesses abroad (Chen and Hennart 2004) shareholders' wealth creation (e.g. Harris & Ravenscraft 1991; Mann and Kohli 2011) , postacquisition integration dynamics (e.g. Vaara 2003; Stahl et al. 2012) , and post-acquisition performance (e.g. Dikova and Sahib 2013; Chang and Tsai 2013) . Only a few studies have studied the circumstances surrounding MNEs' preferences for partial or full acquisitions. Chen and Hennart (2004) for instance found that asymmetric information is one reason for MNEs to reside to partial CB M&As. Jakobsen and Meyer (2008) on the other hand found that in transition economies MNEs engage in partial acquisitions to gain legitimacy and prevent powerful local stakeholders from hijacking the M&A deal. Chen (2008) suggested that partial CB M&As are mostly chosen as a means for capacity control in mature industries and speedy entry into rapidly growing markets. The most recent study by Contractor and colleagues (2014) applies the concept of 'distance' to explain the variation in cross-border acquisition equity levels. We contribute to this relatively unexplored research area by shedding more light on the question what drives MNEs' preferences for partial and full CB M&As.
The concept of distance has assumed a critical role in international business over the past few decades (Zaheer et al. 2012: 9) and institutional distance in particular has taken a central stage in international business (IB) research (Ingram and Silverman 2002; Estrin et al. 2009 ). The concept of institutional distance was coined as the extent of dissimilarity (differences) between the national institutions of the home and host country (Kostova 1997) . It is found to amplify information asymmetries and uncertainties related to resource transfer and resource acquisition (Chen and Hennart 2004; Dikova et al. 2010) . So in the context of CB M&As, what ownership strategies can MNEs implement to remedy the negative effects of distance? For instance, partial acquisitions can be useful in mitigating asymmetric information problems, controlling foreign expansion risk and facilitating the penetration into foreign markets (Zhu and Dutta 2011) . Contractor and colleagues (2014) found that minority acquisitions are chosen to reduce uncertainty caused by informal institutional (cultural) distance. Valuable as it is, the latter study indirectly assumes that all acquirers (MNEs) suffer from distance in a similar way. In other words it suggests a direct relationship between distance and ownership stake in CB M&As thus overlooking a critical boundary condition that limits the effect of distance, the MNEs' local experience in a specific foreign location.
We believe that it is critical to take into consideration the factors that stimulate organizational learning about the local environment. Earlier studies have demonstrated that the possession of market-specific information by the investing firm creates an understanding of the market and its characteristics such as business climate, culture, structure of the market system, and individual customers (Carlsson et al. 2005; Evans et al. 2008) . As a consequence, local market experience eliminates factors that prevent MNE's learning about the foreign environment (Dikova 2009 ).
Here we suggest that local market experience reduces information asymmetries and investment risk caused by institutional distance, which in turn moderates the MNE's preference for partial CB M&A as a way to control investment uncertainties. Schwens et al. 2011; Contractor et al. 2014) . Furthermore, different attitudes, beliefs, value systems and behavioral assumptions of individuals and organizations make the cultural characteristics of emerging economies quite different from developed market economies (Contractor et al. 2014 ). All of these stark differences make the emerging economies not only interesting but also suitable context for studying how institutional differences between home and host nations affect the choice between full and partial CB M&As.
We aspire to making several contributions. First, we further advance existing research by drawing on two particular literature streams-the one dealing with the influence of national institutions on MNEs' strategies (Peng 2003; Peng et al. 2008; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn 2007; Dikova et al. 2010 ) and the other investigating the role of organizational learning in CB M&As (Nadolska and Barkema 2007; Dikova et al. 2010) . With this approach we offer new insights into the Finnish MNEs acquisitive behavior in institutionally different emerging economies. These insights add to the pool of knowledge concerning the drivers of the MNE preference for partial over full CB M&As. Second, we point to the importance of location-specific experience for CB M&As. We suggest that previous experience in the host country can be expected to offset some of the acquisition problems associated with institutional distance. Finally, most of the literature on CB M&As has focused on studying and explaining acquisition outcomes such as synergies and abnormal returns. We advance our understanding of the key institutional and organizational factors that affect how CB M&A deals are structured, a topic that has received much less attention especially in the IB research.
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
According to North (1990:3) , institutions are 'humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. Both formal and informal institutions (North 1990 ) are nation-specific; therefore their ability to reduce uncertainty in human interaction and economic transactions varies across national borders. Moreover, emerging economy institutions differ substantially from developed market economies (Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007) , which reduces investing MNEs' ability to fully understand the local rules of the game. As a consequence, MNEs engaging in emerging-economy complex business transactions such as M&As encounter environmental intricacy and ambiguity that cannot be fully deciphered by drawing on the knowledge of the home-based institutions (Dikova et al., 2010) . Moreover, institutional distance further increases the difficulty and uncertainty surrounding the CB M&A deal because MNEs adjust more easily to an institutional environment that is similar to their home country (Dikova et al. 2010 ).
Organizations accumulate experience through learning how to operate in a specific business environment (March 1991) . By building familiarity with the host country, MNEs gradually reduce their perceived level of uncertainty about doing business in the new environment (Meyer and Tran 2006) . Reversely, MNEs with relatively limited (or no) experience in a particular market tend to be at a disadvantage due to the lack of knowledge about specific conditions critical for the local operations (Hennart 1991; Hitt and Pisano 2009) . Host country specific knowledge is of greater importance for investing MNEs especially in emerging economies (e.g. MNEs operating in emerging economies face issues ranging from government intervention at strategic level to day-to-day operational hindrances (Demirbag et al., 2008 (Demirbag et al., , 2009 Khanna and Palepu 2010) . Depending on the level of local knowledge and experience, the risks of acquiring business operations in emerging economies can be substantial (Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Arslan and Larimo, 2011) . However, ownership strategy is a useful tool in reducing unfamiliarity hazards (Dikova 2009 ). Shared ownership can reduce the costs associated with liability of foreignness or environmental uncertainty-with superior local knowledge and local connections local partners can assist MNEs in reducing their unfamiliarity with the environment and in enhancing local legitimacy (Gaur and Lu 2007) . This is particularly relevant in emerging economies where the ownership of many companies is controlled by a family or a business group and retaining the help of these individuals after the foreign acquisition is of extreme importance especially for MNEs less familiar with the emerging market context (Contractor et al. 2014) . We hereby present separate arguments with regard to the role of informal and formal institutional distance and host country experience on the MNEs choice between full or partial M&A in emerging economies.
Formal institutional distance and ownership strategies in cross-border M&A
Formal institutions (laws, regulations, political systems, etc.) are different across countries due to differences in historical origins as well as different paces of development of legal structures (e.g. Beck et al. 2003; Arslan and Larimo 2011) . CB M&As are often subject to local regulatory scrutiny induced by bureaucratic self-interest, local political extraction and private benefits such as protecting local firms (Bittlingmayer and Hazlett 2000) . Moreover, the legal environment of a country influences CB M&As' takeover premium, as well as the agency costs of transaction and integration of the acquired firm (Barbopoulos et al. 2012) .
Due diligence can also be difficult especially in emerging economies because the different regulative structures and accounting standards may can cause problems with evaluation of the target's assets (Dikova et al. 2010 ). This in turn may either lead to over-paying for the acquired business, or may mislead the investors to over-estimate the possibility to combine the target's assets with the assets of the MNE in a way that creates value for the MNE. Furthermore, the process of acquiring a local firm in an emerging economy can be a slow and difficult due to Past studies have noted that in the case of significant regulatory differences between the home and the host countries, the complexity of the CB M&A deal increases which in turn elevates the uncertainty and risk of the deal (Dikova et al. 2010 ). Under such circumstances, MNEs investing in CB M&As in emerging economies may on the one hand prefer to limit their financial exposure by decreasing their equity commitment and pursuing a partial acquisition (Duarte and Garica Canal 2004) . On the other hand, by choosing a partial acquisition in a country with very different formal institutional framework, MNEs can rely on the local partner to align their strategic goals with the specific legal requirements of the emerging economy (Meyer 2002) . Partial acquisitions provide the possibility to reduce ambiguity (e.g. Eden and Miller 2004) especially because operating under different local rules may create problems with incorporating organizational structures, practices and strategies from the headquarters (Chen and Hennart 2002; Kostova and Roth 2002) . Local ownership may ease some of the acquisition hurdles and speed up the negotiation process in emerging economies (Jakobsen and Meyer 2008) , especially if the CB M&A involves restructuring, staff redundancies and job losses (Estrin et al. 2009 ). Partial acquisition gives an incentive to local owners and managers to render ongoing support to the firm since they are well acquainted with local customs, regulations, business networks, and customer preferences (Contractor et al. 2014) . Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: High formal institutional distance leads to a preference for partial acquisition over full acquisition in emerging economies.
Next, we address the joint effect of formal institutional distance and organizational learning on MNE's choice between full and partial CB M&As in emerging economies. Emerging economies CB M&As are plagued by asymmetric information: for example, the potential buyers know less about the value of the target than their owners or stakeholders (Reuer and Koza 2000) . This is partially caused by inadequate stock markets and financial systems, which are typical characteristics of emerging economies. The companies for sale in such markets may be 'lemons' yet pre-acquisition inspections can be expensive when the assets of interest for the potential acquirer are tacit technological knowhow or brand-specific goodwill (Harris and Ravenscraft 1991) . Full acquisitions also mean the highest resource commitment and capital cost making them more risky and costly (Contractor et al. 2014 ).
In institutionally distant emerging economies, a MNE without previous experience with the host environment is likely to seek the cooperation of the owners to reduce their motivation to inflate the value of the assets (Chen and Hennart 2004) , to avoid prolonging the deal negotiations or incurring additional unforeseen costs. Under such circumstances, locally inexperienced MNEs are unlikely to opt for a full acquisition. However, previous host country specific experience is likely to equip MNEs with knowledge of well performing local players that can be considered as potential (and suitable) targets for an acquisition. Dikova and colleagues (2010) noted that if a MNE engages in a CB M&A in a country Y then many of the skills necessary to complete that deal would be specific to the particular M&A deal and country Y. We extend this argument and suggest that business experience in the local environment would generate certain skills and knowledge about the local context that would be beneficial to the MNE engaging in a CB M&A; in turn the deal uncertainty and risk caused by formal institutional distance are significantly reduced. Full CB M&A ownership means that the acquirer can enjoy all the future profits of a successful acquisition and the freedom of completely independent decision-making. Therefore, we argue that MNEs with host country experience are likely to prefer full acquisition over partial acquisition despite institutional differences as they are better equipped to deal with the local acquisition process and the post-acquisition integration, a direct result of the accumulated knowledge of local business context (Hayward 2002; Zaheer et al. 2013 
Informal institutional distance and ownership strategies in cross-border M&A
Informal institutional distance is caused by differences in norms, values and beliefs between countries (Peng 2003; Estrin et al. 2009; Arslan and Larimo 2011) . The knowledge about informal institutions of a country is embedded in the social structures and requires intensive cross cultural understanding by the investing MNEs (North 1990; Peng 2003; Estrin et al. 2009 ).
Organizational structures are part of the firm's administrative heritage which is typically rooted in the national culture (Dikova and van Witteloostuijn 2007) . This indicates that post-acquisition integration into the MNE organizational structure might be difficult to administer in culturally distant CB M&As. Informal institutions also impact different aspects of the foreign subsidiary management such as the ability to understand the aspirations of local employees, and to establish socialization practices and routines for the purpose of knowledge transfer (e.g. Kostova and Roth 2002) . The greater the informal institutional distance, the more challenging it would be for the MNE make sense of the local organizational culture, understand and connect with the local employees and ultimately establish a solid base for knowledge exchange. Furthermore, past research has found that the lack of trust in the local management is often a deal-breaker in CB M&As (Very and Schweiger 2001; Stahl et al. 2012) . Informal institutional differences, often associated with cultural differences, can lead to the use of ambiguous language in the acquisition agreement which in turn can exacerbate the lack of trust between the negotiating parties in a CB M&A, create conflicts and disputes as MNEs seek to finalize the M&A deal (Dikova et al. 2010) and finally cause delays in the post-acquisition integration process (Bruner 2005) .
MNEs investing in emerging economies that are characterized with informal institutional distance would likely benefit from a certain degree of strategic flexibility. We expect that choosing partial acquisitions in such emerging economies can not only offer the advantage of lesser resource commitments to the foreign MNEs (Hill et al. 1990 ), but also increase the flexibility in strategy and operations for the MNEs (Datta et al. 2009 ). Past studies have noted that differences in the informal institutional environment are linked to problems associated with information disclosure (e.g. Ali and Hwang 2000). However, when the acquired firm is also a partner in the M&A (as opposed to being fully acquired and assimilated by the MNE), it can be expected that information disclosure problems for foreign MNEs will be reduced due to the vested interests of the local partner (Duarte and Garcia-Canal 2004) . Co-ownership in the CB M&A also reduces the danger of dramatic organizational changes or a total annihilation of the local organizational culture, thus increasing the willingness of the target-firm management to cooperate. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a: High informal institutional distance leads to a preference for partial acquisition over full acquisition in emerging economies.
Next, we address the joint effect of informal institutional distance and organizational learning on MNE's choice between full and partial CB M&As in emerging economies. Substantial informal differences can magnify MNE's management perceptions of investment risk and uncertainties and the extent to which home-made routines, procedures, and management practices can be efficiently transferred to and implemented in the new location. Furthermore, such differences may escalate MNE's challenges to successfully establish, monitor and sustain relationships with the local management and various stakeholders, due to differences in attitudes, beliefs, value systems and behavioral assumptions of organizational actors (Contractor et al. 2014) . High informal institutional (cultural) distance elevates the level of anxiety and discomfort related to uncertain, unpredictable outcomes and unforeseen costs (Zhao et al. 2004) . Hence, in such case, it is likely that MNE's management without host country experience would not engage in an We use three items from World competitiveness yearbooks including openness to new ideas, corruption, and flexibility and adaptability of people in host economies. Corruption or acceptance of corruption in a society has been referred as an example of informal institutions especially in emerging economies (e.g. Peng et al. 2008; Richey 2010; Tonoyan et al. 2010 ). We further argue that the society's openness to the foreign ideas captured by national culture item in this study appropriately addresses the attitude to operations of foreign firms in host economies.
The openness of any society to the foreign ideas (and foreign firms) has been referred as one of the important characteristics of societies that developed and achieved economic competitiveness (e.g. North 1981 ). Finally, an important aspect of informal institutional environment is flexibility and adaptability of people in a society that influences economic and social behavior as well as competitiveness (de Los Reyes, 2000; Folke et al., 2010) . Hence, this indicator is also part of our measure of informal institutional distance.
Following Kogut and Singh (1988) formula for calculating distance, we calculate formal and informal institutional distances.
Sample Description:
We follow the IMF (2013) American economies and South Africa opened more for foreign MNE activities and acquisitions during 1990s, the sample time period selection is in line with the study goals. The study sample is rather evenly divided between full (48.9%) and partial acquisitions (51.1%). Moreover, we can also observe that most acquisitions were made in low tech (45.1%) and medium tech (43.5%) industries, which is expected in the context of emerging economies. Finally, the regional distribution shows the highest number of acquisitions in the CEE region including the Russian Federation (53.4%), and the lowest in Africa (5.7%). The main characteristics of our study sample are summarized in table 1.
Insert Table 1 here

Variables descriptions and operationalization:
The dependent variable of the study is a cross-border acquisition, which is coded 1 for partial acquisitions (94% or less equity at time of investment) and 0 for full acquisitions (95% or more equity ownership at time of investment).
The equity ownership of 95% has been used as a cut-off point in our study because most of the previous studies analyzing full vs. partial acquisition strategy have categorized equity ownership of 95% or more at the time of acquisition as full acquisition (e.g. Chen and Hennart 2002, 2004; Jakobsen and Meyer 2008) . We performed robustness tests with alternative levels of full ownership (90% and 100%). The results remain similar to those reported in the paper. In line with past literature (see table 2), we use a number of control variables at the country, industry and firm level, in order to enhance the validity of the study findings.
Insert Table 2 CB M&A ownership stake as a dichotomous choice is inferior to the approach used by Contractor and colleagues (2014) who consider CB M&A stake as a choice between minority, majority and full ownership. However, following this approach would require a multinomial regression and unlike logistic regression which offers a clear-cut interpretation of the moderating effects, the interpretation of moderating effects in multinomial regression is not without problems (Greene 2007) . Since our aim is to study and explain the moderating effect of MNE experience on the relationship between institutional distance and CB M&A ownership, we chose the more suitable method, namely logistic regression. The binomial logistic regression model is formally expressed as
P (yi=1) = 1/ 1+ exp (-a-XiB)
Where yi is the dependent variable, Xi is the vector of independent variables for the ith observation, a is the intercept parameter and B is the vector of regression coefficients (Amemiya, 1981) . The recent version of SPSS i.e. PASW 21 is used for the binomial regression analysis in this study. Since the dependent variable has been coded with value 1 for partial acquisition a positive regression coefficient indicates that a particular independent variable increases the probability of partial acquisition choice by the investing MNEs.
RESULTS
The correlation matrix showing pairwise correlations among all the variables of the study is presented in Table 3 . The pairwise correlations do not seem to present serious multicollinearity problems for the multivariate analysis, as none of the variables have correlation coefficients above 0.60 (Hair et al. 2013: 227-230) . However, following Pallant (2007) we conduct additional multicollinearity diagnostic (tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF). According to Wetherill (1986) , the VIF value should not exceed 10. In the current study, the VIF values of the all the variables are lower than 3 and consequently, the potential collinearity among variables is not expected to influence the results of binomial logistic regression analysis. Table 3 here Table 4 displays the results of our binomial regression analysis. The explanatory power of all the statistical models of the study is good, as their chi-square (x²) values are significant at p≤0.01 level. Moreover, the predictive capability of the statistical models can be assessed by the correct classification rate. All the models of the study have a higher correct classification rate than the chance rate of 50%, which is calculated using the proportional chance criterion which is a 2 +
Insert
(1-a) 2 , where a is a proportion of partial acquisitions (51.1%) in the study sample. The regression models show correct classification rates from 73.4% to 74.5%; this is 23.4% to 24.5% improvement in the classification rates of the regression models, which can be considered satisfactory. Moreover, Nagelkerke R 2 (0.281, 0.292 and 0.297) values further show relatively good predictive capability of all three models.
Insert Table 4 here
Model 1 This renders support to our first hypothesis (1a). The regression results further show that high informal institutional distance leads to a preference for partial acquisitions; this result supports hypothesis 2a of our study.
Model 3 in table 4 shows the regression output for the interaction terms of formal and informal institutional distances with MNE host country experience. From the main effects of MNE host country experience we infer that Finnish MNEs with high host country experience preferred full acquisitions over partial acquisitions. The regression coefficients of the interaction variables
Formal institutional distance X MNE host country experience, and, Informal institutional distance X MNE host country experience are significant and negative indicating a preference for full acquisitions over partial acquisitions. These findings are in line with hypotheses 1b and 2b of the study. In order to verify the support for the moderating effects, we plot the mean predicted probabilities of partial acquisition choice with high and low ends of formal institutional distance and MNE host country experience as shown in figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
The plot also depicts that the probability of partial CB M&A choice decreases for MNEs with high host country experience acquiring in countries with high formal institutional distance. We further plot the mean predicted probabilities of partial CB M&As with high and low ends of informal institutional distance and MNE host country experience, in order to demonstrate the potential moderating influences of host country experience. The plot (figure 2) depicts that the probability of partial CB M&A decreases for MNEs with high host country experience acquiring in countries with high informal institutional distance.
Insert Figure 2 here
CONTRIBUTIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Our study offers several theoretical, empirical and managerial contributions. The theoretical contribution is specifically linked to the combination of macro and micro level contingencies. Like all studies, our paper has certain limitations. Firstly, this study only addresses CB M&As from the perspective of ownership strategy. Therefore, other aspects of CB M&As (like postacquisition integration, knowledge transfer strategy etc) are not addressed in our paper. Secondly, we treat ownership stake as a dichotomous variable, which reduces the range of possibilities MNEs can choose from when they engage in CB M&A. Third, the study sample is limited to CB 
